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a b s t r a c t
We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment
bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts
rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining power
profit may perversely rise and the union’s utility may fall.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license. n1. Introduction
In the strategic delegation literature it is well known that in
a Cournot oligopoly firms try to achieve strategic advantage over
their rivals by offering sales-oriented incentives to their managers
(Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987). The con-
sequence is overproduction (relative to the Cournot level). How-
ever, if wage is endogenously determined through bargaining, as
Szymanski (1994) has shown, overproductionwill be accompanied
by wage increase, and the sales-oriented scheme will not be al-
ways optimal. Themanagerswill face a tension between the task of
competing with other firms and the task of negotiating wage with
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Open access under CC BY licethe union. The optimal incentive scheme reduces this tension by
moderating or even reversing emphasis on sales. In a different con-
text, Basu et al. (1997) also showed that a firm would shy away
from sales orientation, if it were to face a tax-setting government.
However, it is not well understood what incentive scheme
would be optimal if the manager was entrusted with the task of
bargaining alone, without having to worry about strategic rivalry.
It is also unclearwhether efficiencywill be in conflictwith distribu-
tion. Further, one-sided delegation obscures the issue of optimality
of delegation itself.
In this paper we address these problems by considering a
monopoly setupwhere both the shareholders and theworkers del-
egate the task of bargaining to a manager and a union leader re-
spectively. The manager is asked to maximize sales or profit, and
the union leader is asked to maximize the gross or net wage bill.
The bargaining protocol we use is efficient bargaining (McDonald
and Solow, 1981). We find that the manager will always be ori-
ented to profit maximization and the union leader to net wage bill
maximization. Consequently, there will be underproduction caus-
ing the bargaining pie to shrink severely. How much the pie will
se. 
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powers of the players. Starting from a given configuration of bar-
gaining powers, if one party gets stronger his claim over the bar-
gaining pie will be greater, but then his ‘weaker’ opponent will
retaliate with harder incentives to reverse his payoff increase. If
the second effect overwhelms the first effect, the stronger player’s
payoff will fall. We construct examples to illustrate this surprising
possibility. We also show that if the players’ decisions to delegate
are endogenized, delegation emerges as their dominant strategy.
2. The model
We consider a monopoly with labor as the only input, which
along with wage is subjected to negotiation. The firm’s sales rev-
enue is denoted as s = p(q)q, where q is the output, and p(q) is the
standard inverse demand curve, p′(q) < 0, p′′(q) ≤ 0. Assuming a
concave production function q = q(l), we write s = s(l), s′′(l) < 0.
The shareholders of the firm hire a manager and offer an
incentive scheme z, which is, as in Fershtman and Judd (1987), a
linear combination of sales s and profit π as follows:
z = βπ + (1− β)s = s(l)− βwl. (1)
Non-trivial delegation arises if β ≠ 1, and there are two types of
delegation that can arise: sales oriented delegation (i.e. β < 1),
and profit oriented delegation (i.e. β > 1). Shareholders maximize
profit π = s− wl.
The workers’ union consists of N identical workers whose
reservation wage is θ and its objective function is u = (w − θ)l.
At the worker selection stage, l members are randomly hired and
the remaining (N − l)members receive the reservation wage from
outside.Workers appoint a union leaderwho is asked tomaximize:
v = γ u(·)+ (1− γ )wl = wl− γ θ l. (2)
Delegation is captured by γ ≠ 1. If γ > 1 the union leader is ori-
ented to net wage bill maximization as opposed to γ < 1 when he
is oriented to gross wage bill maximization. Effectively, the leader
is induced to overvalue (γ > 1) or undervalue (γ < 1) the oppor-
tunity cost of the union.
The firm’s wage and employment are an outcome of bargaining
between the firm manager and the union leader. This is a scenario
of efficient bargaining between two delegates. The bargaining
power of the union leader (and also the union) is exogenously given
by α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and the manager’s (and also the shareholders’)
bargaining power is (1 − α). The reservation payoffs of all parties
are zero.
In stage 1 of this simple game the shareholders choose β and
simultaneously, the union chooses γ . Then in stage 2wage and em-
ployment (and consequently output) are determined through gen-
eralized Nash bargaining. We first consider the stage 2 problem,
which is solved bymaximizing B = [vαz1−α]with respect to (w, l).
The solution yields (for the derivation see Chatterjee and Saha,
2013)
s′(l) = βγ θ, (3)
w = (1− α)γ θ + α s(l)
βl
. (4)
Eqs. (3) and (4) give employment and wage respectively. In
particular, note that the output choice is not directly affected by
the bargaining powers, and l maximizes (s(l) − βγ θ). It is easy
to check that ∂ l/∂β < 0, and likewise ∂ l/∂γ < 0. Moreover,
when β = γ = 1, Eq. (3) yields the efficient level of output and
Eq. (4) expresses the wage rate as a weighted average of the
marginal revenue product and average revenue product of labor.
We now characterize the optimal incentive schemes. In stage
1, the shareholders and the union perfectly anticipate l and w (as
given implicitly by Eqs. (3) and (4)) and choose β and γ from thefollowing equations:
π ′(β) = 1
β2

β2(β − 1)γ θ ∂ l
∂β
+ αs(·)

= 0, (5)
u′(γ ) = θ

(γ − 1) ∂ l
∂γ
+ (1− α)l

= 0. (6)
Let (β∗, γ ∗) be the Nash equilibrium incentives satisfying
Eqs. (5) and (6) and assume that the equilibrium is unique and sta-
ble. It is obvious that unless β∗ > 1, Eq. (5) does not hold for any
α > 0. Likewise, Eq. (6) does not hold, unless γ ∗ > 1 given any
α < 1. That is to say, both sides will incentivize their delegates
to cut back on production. In the special case of α = 0, β∗ = 1;
similarly, when α = 1, γ ∗ = 1. In the Appendix we show as part
of the proof of Proposition 1 that β and γ are strategic substitutes
to each other. This helps us to compare incentives between bilat-
eral and unilateral delegations. Let us define βu and γu to be the
optimal incentives under unilateral delegations. That is, βu solves
Eq. (5) for γ = 1, and γu solves Eq. (6) for β = 1. The following
proposition characterizes the optimal incentives.
Proposition 1 (Delegation for Bargaining). In equilibrium, the share-
holders will orient the manager to profit maximization (i.e. β∗ > 1)
and the workers will orient their union leader to net wage bill maxi-
mization (i.e. γ ∗ > 1). However, the higher the bargaining power, the
weaker the incentives; that is, β ′(α) > 0, γ ′(α) < 0. Thus, in the ex-
treme case, one’s incentive to delegate fully disappears, when one’s
bargaining power is maximum. Finally, in comparison to the cases
of unilateral delegation, incentives under bilateral delegation will be
muted (i.e. β∗ ≤ βu and γ ∗ ≤ γu).
The combined effects of profit and net wage bill orientations
cause severe ‘underproduction’ relative to the no-delegation level
(see Eq. (3)). Consequently the bargaining pie will shrink, with
uncertain implications for individual payoffs. Greater bargaining
power directly increases one’s entitlement to the share of the pie
and softens one’s incentives, but simultaneously it hardens the
rival’s incentives, unleashing conflicting effects on one’s payoff. To
see this we apply the envelope theorem and obtain
π ′(α) = −
 s(l∗)
l∗
− β∗γ ∗θ  
 l∗
β∗
− θ
(1− α)l∗ − γ ∗(β∗ − 1) ∂ l∗
∂γ  
 ∂γ ∗
∂α
,
> 0 > 0 < 0
(7)
u′(α) =
 s(l∗)
l∗
− β∗γ ∗θ  
 l∗
β∗
−
αs(l∗)
β∗2
− (γ ∗ − 1)θ ∂ l
∗
∂β  
 ∂β∗
∂α
. (8)
> 0 > 0 > 0
The first term of Eq. (7) (inside the bracket) is positive because
of concavity of s(l). The expression inside the bracket of the second
term is also positive due to the fact that ∂ l∗/∂γ < 0. So the overall
effect is ambiguous; a similar ambiguity is seen from Eq. (8). Thus,
we have a curious possibility—profit can increase and the union’s
utility can decrease with an increase in the bargaining power of
the union. The ambiguity somewhat diminishes (but does not dis-
appear) if only one side delegates. For example, if only the share-
holders delegate, π ′(α) < 0 (because γ is held constant at 1), but
u′(α) remains ambiguous. Similarly, if only the workers delegate,
u′(α) > 0, but π ′(α) is ambiguous. To resolve this ambiguity, we
consider an example.
2.1. An example
We assume linear demand and constant returns to scale (CRS)
technology. Suppose p = a − q and q = l. The stage 2 Nash
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bargaining employment and wage are:
l = a− βγ θ
2
, w = α(a+ βγ θ)
2β
+ (1− α)γ θ.
The resultant profit and utility are
π =

a− (a− βγ θ)
2
− α (a+ βγ θ)
2β
− (1− α)θγ

× (a− βγ θ)
2
u =

α
(a+ βγ θ)
2β
+ (1− α)θγ − θ

(a− βγ θ)
2
.
By maximizing these we obtain the optimal β and γ from the
following:
−β2γ 2θ2 [2(β − 1)+ α]+ αa2 = 0, (9)
(1− α)(a− βθγ )+ βθ(1− γ ) = 0. (10)
It is clear that if α = 0, then β∗ = 1, and if α > 0, then β∗ > 1
(since a > β∗γ ∗θ for positive output). Similarly, if α = 1, γ ∗ = 1
and at α < 1, γ ∗ > 1. Further, we can ascertain how the bargain-
ing pie, P = π +u = s(l)− θ l, behaves with respect to α. Let P∗ be
the equilibrium bargaining pie under bilateral delegation, and let
PU and PF be the same respectively when only the union delegates
and when only the shareholders delegate. This is summarized in
the following remark.
Remark 1 (LinearDemand, CRS Technology andBargaining Pie). Sup-
pose the demand curve is linear and production exhibits constant
returns to scale. Then for any α ∈ [0, 1], the bargaining pie un-
der bilateral delegation, P∗, is bounded above by the smallest of
the bargaining pies under unilateral delegation. That is P∗ ≤ min
[PF , PU ].
Simulation: We set a = 2 and θ = 1 and report the relevant
figures in Table 1. Case 0 is the case of no delegation.Withβ = γ =
1 we obtain the standard results—employment and the bargaining
pie (π + u) remain invariant to α and π ′(α) < 0.
Case 1 and Case 2 represent the cases of unilateral delegation by
shareholders and workers respectively. In both cases employment
is lower, and so is the bargaining pie. In Case 1 wage does not grow
withα asmuch as it does in Case 0, and consequently profit ismuch
higher. In Case 2, bothwage and the union’s utility aremuch higher
than the no delegation case. In both cases, u′(α) > 0, π ′(α) < 0.
Case 3 describes bilateral delegation. Here employment is the
lowest, and the pie is the smallest though it is increasing in α. A
visual illustration of the relationship between the bargaining pie
and theunion’s bargaining power under different scenarios is given
in Fig. 1. But themost dramatic finding is the reversal of the relation
between π and α. Here, π ′(α) > 0 and u′(α) < 0. The intuition is
that with an increase in the union’s bargaining power three effects
are unleashed. There is a direct effect leading to a loss in profit.Table 1
Simulation results.
a = 2 θ = 1
Case 0: No delegation (β = 1 γ = 1)
α w l u π π + u
1 1.5 0.5 0.25 0 0.25
0.75 1.375 0.5 0.187 0.063 0.25
0.55 1.275 0.5 0.137 0.113 0.25
0.5 1.25 0.5 0.125 0.125 0.25
0.39 1.195 0.5 0.097 0.153 0.25
0.25 1.125 0.5 0.063 0.187 0.25
0 1 0.5 0 0.25 0.25
Case 1: Only the shareholders delegate (γ = 1)
α β w l u π π + u
1 1.45 1.19 0.275 0.052 0.15 0.199
0.75 1.395 1.16 0.30 0.049 0.16 0.21
0.5 1.322 1.13 0.34 0.043 0.18 0.224
0.25 1.213 1.08 0.39 0.031 0.206 0.24
0 1 1 0.5 0 0.25 0.25
Case 2: Only the union delegates (β = 1)
α γ w l u π π + u
1 1 1.5 0.5 0.25 0 0.25
0.75 1.2 1.5 0.4 0.20 0.04 0.24
0.5 1.33 1.5 0.335 0.167 0.05 0.22
0.25 1.42 1.5 0.29 0.145 0.061 0.20
0 1.5 1.5 0.25 0.125 0.062 0.187
Case 3: Both delegate
α β∗ γ ∗ w l u π π + u
1 1.45 1 1.19 0.275 0.052 0.15 0.199
0.75 1.327 1.10 1.25 0.27 0.068 0.13 0.196
0.55 1.235 1.192 1.309 0.264 0.082 0.113 0.195
0.5 1.21 1.217 1.33 0.263 0.086 0.11 0.193
0.39 1.15 1.28 1.369 0.264 0.097 0.096 0.193
0.25 1.10 1.349 1.41 0.256 0.105 0.09 0.191
0 1 1.5 1.5 0.25 0.125 0.062 0.187
Then there is a second and indirect effect occurring through the
reduced union incentive γ which helps to increase profit. There
is yet another effect occurring through β—adjustment in the firm’s
own incentive term. Sinceβ is optimally adjusted (with any change
inα) its first order effect on profit is zero. Overall, the indirect effect
outweighs the direct effect resulting in the reversal of profit and
union power relationship.
Optimality of delegation: Since π ′(α) > 0 we see from Table 1
that in equilibrium delegation is profitable for the shareholders
(compared to the no delegation case) only afterα exceeds (approx-
imately) 0.55 and for the union only ifα is less than 0.39. Therefore,
at all α ∈ (0.39, 0.55) both parties are worse off after delegation.
Moreover, if we examine the parties’ decision to delegate or not by
comparing the equilibrium payoffs from different scenarios of del-
egation, we see that at all α ∈ (0, 1) delegation is the dominant
strategy for each party. At α = 0 delegation will still be the domi-
nant strategy of the union, but the shareholders will be indifferent
between delegation and no delegation. At α = 1 delegation will be
the dominant strategy of the shareholders, but the union will feel
indifferent.
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Appendix
1. Proof of Proposition 1. Most of the claims are confirmed sim-
ply by a visual inspection of Eqs. (5) and (6). However, the claim
of β∗ ≤ βu and γ ∗ ≤ γu relies on the fact that β and γ are
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ative static properties of β∗ and γ ∗ also need to be ascertained.
Strategic substituteness. We begin by assuming that (β∗, γ ∗)
is a unique Nash equilibrium and it is stable. That is, ∆ = π ′′
(β)u′′(γ )− ∂π ′(·)
∂γ
∂u′(·)
∂β
> 0. To show that β is a strategic substi-
tute to γ , we need to obtain ∂β
∂γ
< 0 from Eq. (5), and to show
that γ is a strategic substitute to β we need to obtain ∂β
∂γ
< 0
from Eq. (6).
From Eq. (5) derive π ′′(β) ∂β
∂γ
+ ∂π ′(β)
∂γ
= 0. Here, π ′′(β) < 0
for the profit function to have a maximum. In fact, this can be
ensured by assuming s′′′(l) ≤ 0 (see Chatterjee and Saha, 2013).
Next, we show ∂π
′(β)
∂γ
< 0. ∂π
′(β)
∂γ
= β2(β − 1)θ ∂ l
∂β
+ β2(β −
1)θγ

θ
s′′(l) − θγ s
′′′(l)
(s′′(l))2
∂ l
∂γ

. Since s′′′(l) ≤ 0, this expression is
negative. Hence ∂β
∂γ
< 0.
Now from Eq. (6) derive u′′(γ ) ∂γ
∂β
+ ∂u′(γ )
∂β
= 0. Again, for
u(γ ) to have a maximum u′′(γ ) must be negative at γ ∗. Fi-
nally, using the fact ∂ l
∂γ
= ∂ l
∂β
β
γ
we write ∂u
′(γ )
∂β
= θβ (γ−1)
γ
∂2 l
∂β2
+θ ∂ l
∂β

(γ−1)
γ
+ (1− α)

.We can show that ∂
2 l
∂β2
= −θγ ∂ l
∂β
s′′′(l)
(s′′)2
≤ 0 if s′′′(l) ≤ 0. Then it is clear that ∂u′(γ )
∂β
< 0. This allows us
to conclude that ∂γ
∂β
< 0.
Comparative statics. Differentiating Eqs. (5) and (6), andusing
the facts that ∂π
′(β)
∂α
= s(l)
β2
> 0 and ∂u
′(γ )
∂α
= −θ l < 0, we obtain
∂β
∂α
= 1
∆

−∂π
′(β)
∂α
u′′(γ )+ ∂π
′(β)
∂γ
∂u′(γ )
∂α

= − 1
∆

s(l)
β2
u′′(γ )+ θ l∂π
′(β)
∂γ

> 0,
∂γ
∂α
= 1
∆

−∂u
′(γ )
∂α
π ′′(β)+ ∂π
′(β)
∂α
∂u′(γ )
∂β

= 1
∆

θ lπ ′′(β)+ s(l)
β2
∂u′(γ )
∂β

< 0.To see β∗ ≤ βu note that β∗ is an optimal response to
γ ∗ ≥ 1, whereas βu is an optimal response to γ = 1. Since
β and γ are strategic substitutes, it must be that β∗ ≤ βu. Anal-
ogous reasoning establishes γ ∗ ≤ γu. 
2. Proof of Remark 1. Suppose α ∈ (0, 1) and both sides dele-
gate. From Eq. (9) we obtain β∗γ ∗θ = a[α/{2(β∗−1)+α}]1/2.
Contrast this with the case of unilateral delegation by the
firm (where γ = 1 and we write β = βu): βuθ = a[α/{2(βu −
1) + α}]1/2. βu is the optimal response to γ = 1, and β∗ is the
optimal response to γ ∗ > 1. Since β and γ are strategic substi-
tutes, it must be that βu > β∗. Hence, β∗γ ∗θ > βuθ .
Now consider Eq. (10). Rewrite it as β∗γ ∗θ = [(1 − α)a +
β∗θ ]/(2 − α). Contrast this with the case of unilateral delega-
tion by the union. Set β = 1 and γ = γu in the above and it is
clearly smaller. Hence, we can say β∗γ ∗θ > γuθ . This allows us
to conclude that for any α ∈ (0, 1), β∗γ ∗ > max[βu, γu] and
hence P∗ < min[PU , PF ].
Finally consider α = 0 and α = 1. At α = 0, β∗ = βu = 1
and γ ∗ = γu > 1. Therefore, P∗ = PU . Alternatively, when
α = 1, βu > 1 and γ ∗ = γu = 1. Hence, P∗ = PF .
Combining all these observations we write, P∗ ≤ min[PF ,
PU ]. 
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